Coping with Physical Attacks on Random Network Structures by Gold, Omer & Cohen, Reuven
ar
X
iv
:1
31
2.
61
89
v2
  [
cs
.SY
]  
24
 D
ec
 20
13
Coping with Physical Attacks on Random
Network Structures
Omer Gold∗ Reuven Cohen†
Abstract
Communication networks are vulnerable to natural disasters, such as earth-
quakes or floods, as well as to physical attacks, such as an Electromagnetic Pulse
(EMP) attack. Such real-world events happen at specific geographical locations and
disrupt specific parts of the network. Therefore, the geographical layout of the
network determines the impact of such events on the network’s physical topology
in terms of capacity, connectivity, and flow.
Recent works focused on assessing the vulnerability of a deterministic (geograph-
ical) network to such events. In this work, we focus on assessing the vulnerability
of (geographical) random networks to such disasters. We consider stochastic graph
models in which nodes and links are probabilistically distributed on a plane, and
model the disaster event as a circular cut that destroys any node or link within or
intersecting the circle.
We develop algorithms for assessing the damage of both targeted and non-
targeted (random) attacks and determining which attack locations have the ex-
pected most disruptive impact on the network. Then, we provide experimental
results for assessing the impact of circular disasters to communications networks in
the USA, where the network’s geographical layout was modeled probabilistically, re-
lying on demographic information only. Our results demonstrates the applicability
of our algorithms to real-world scenarios.
Our novel approach allows to examine how valuable is public information about
the network’s geographical area (e.g., demography, topography, economy) to an
attacker’s destruction assessment capabilities in the case the network’s physical
topology is hidden, and examine the affect of hiding the actual physical location of
the fibers on the attack strategy. Thereby, our schemes can be used as a tool for
policy makers and engineers to design more robust networks by placing links along
paths that avoid areas of high damage cuts, or identifying locations which require
additional protection efforts (e.g., equipment shielding).
Overall, the work demonstrates that using stochastic modeling and geometry
can significantly contribute to our understanding of network survivability and re-
silience.
Index Terms—Network survivability, physical attacks, geographic networks, random
networks, optical networks, large scale failures, Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP).
∗Department of Computer Science, Bar-Ilan University, Israel. email: omergolden@gmail.com.
†Department of Mathematics, Bar-Ilan University, Israel. email: reuven@math.biu.ac.il.
1
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
In the last decades, telecommunication networks have been increasingly crucial for in-
formation distribution, control of infrastructure and technological services, as well as for
economies in general. Large scale malfunctions and failures in these networks, due to nat-
ural disasters, operator errors or malicious attacks pose a considerable threat to the well
being and health of individuals all over the industrialized world. It is therefore of con-
siderable importance to investigate the robustness and vulnerabilities of such networks,
and to find methods for improving their resilience and stability.
The global communications infrastructure relies heavily on physical infrastructure
(such as optical fibers, amplifiers, routers, and switches), making them vulnerable to
physical attacks, such as Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) attacks, as well as natural dis-
asters, such as solar flares, earthquakes, hurricanes, and floods [8], [16], [17], [40], [41].
During a crisis, telecommunication is essential to facilitate the control of physically re-
mote agents, provide connections between emergency response personnel, and eventually
enable reconstitution of societal functions. Such real-world disasters happen in specific
geographic locations, therefore the geographical layout of the network has a crucial factor
on their impact.
Although there has been significant research on network survivability, most previous
works consider a small number of isolated failures or focus on shared risk groups (e.g., [6],
[27], [34] and references therein). On the other hand, work on large-scale attacks focused
mostly on cyber-attacks (viruses and worms) (e.g., [5], [18], [24]) and thereby, focus on
the logical Internet topology. In contrast, we consider events causing a large number
of failures in a specific geographical region, resulting in failures of network components
(represented by nodes and links) which are geographically located within or intersecting
the affected region.
This emerging field of geographically correlated failures, has started gaining attention
only recently, e.g., [31, 32, 33, 30, 2, 4, 29, 28], in these works, algorithms were proposed
for assessing the impact of such geographically correlated failures to a given deterministic
network, and finding a location (or set of locations) where a disaster will cause maximum
disruptive damage to the network, measured by either capacity, connectivity or flow
terms. Various failure models were studied in these works, mainly in the form of a
circular region failures or line-segment failures, such that any station or fiber within
or intersecting the affected region is destroyed. Such failures were studied under the
assumption of deterministic failures, as well as random failures (i.e. a circular region
failure located randomly over the map), and probabilistic failures (e.g. gives the ability
to study cases when a component’s fails in proportion to its distance from the attacked
point). While various failure models were studied in these works, in all of them, the
network’s layout is assumed to be deterministic, i.e. the geographical locations of nodes
and links are known. To the best of our knowledge, spatial non-deterministic networks
(e.g. spatial random networks) survivability were not studied under the assumptions of
geographically correlated failures, and this work is the first to do so.
In this work we focus on the problem of geographically correlated failures in context of
spatial random networks, in particular, finding locations where a disaster or an attack on,
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Figure 1: Color map of the the USA population density in logarithmic scale. Data is
taken from [20].
will cause the most disruptive impact on the network. Before this work, that was one of
the most significant unstudied problems in the field, as similar problems for deterministic
networks was recently studied extensively.
We consider a stochastic model in which nodes and links are probabilistically dis-
tributed geographically on a plane. The motivation behind it is to examine the reliability
of a network where we possess only partial (probabilistic) information about its geograph-
ical layout. For example, a geographically hidden network where the adversary possesses
only partial information about the network topology or no knowledge at all. We show
that valuable probabilistic knowledge about the network’s geographical layout can be
modeled from publicly available data, such as demographic maps, topographic maps,
economy maps, etc. A simple example uses the fact that in densely populated areas the
probability for stations (nodes) to exist is high compared to desolated areas, in which it
is less likely to find many stations. Similarly, the probability for existence of a fiber (link)
between two stations can be modeled as a function of the distance between the stations,
the population density in the station’s regions, and possibly other parameters relating to
the endpoints and geography.
We study the impact of circular geographically correlated failures centered in a specific
geographical location (referred as “circular cut”). The impact of such an event is on all the
networks’ component, i.e. stations, fibers (represented as nodes and links) intersecting the
circle (including its interior). Each network component located within or intersecting the
circular cut is considered to be destroyed. The damage is measured by the total expected
capacity of the intersected links, or by the total number of failed network components.
It is relevant to note that in the case of a large-scale disaster or physical attack,
where many links fail simultaneously, current technology will not be able to handle very
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large-scale re-provisioning (see for example, the CORONET project [11]). Therefore, we
assume that lightpaths are static, implying that if a lightpath is destroyed, all the data
that it carries is lost. However, the main data loss damage is caused by the inability to
use those failed fibers, remaining the post-attack network (the network without the failed
fibers) limited only to the components outside the attack’s region. Thus, a scenario that
the location and the size of the attack causes large-scale failures is fatal for the ability to
transmit data not only from locations within the attack’s region, but also from locations
outside the region that are connected through fibers that go through the region.
The ability to probabilistically model a network using information such as demo-
graphic maps (see illustration in Fig. 1), terrain maps, economy maps, etc. can be used
as an input to our algorithms for estimating the damage of attacks in different locations,
and determining a location where an attack will cause maximum expected disruptive
damage in terms of capacity or connectivity. This is important in assessing the expected
damage from an attack by an adversary with limited knowledge. In order to design a
more robust and well defended system one can consider the resilience of the actual net-
work topology compared to the appropriate random model, and also consider the effect of
hiding the actual physical location of fibers on the attack strategy and expected damage
by an adversary.
In section 4.3 we provide experimental results that demonstrate the applicability of
our algorithms to estimate the expected impact of circular cuts in different locations on
communication networks in the USA, and to find locations of (approximately) worst-case
cuts for this model, where the network’s layout was modeled relying on demographic
information only (see Fig. 1).
Overall in this work, we study the vulnerability of various spatial random network
structures to geographically correlated failures. That is networks which their components’
locations (nodes and links) are distributed probabilistically on the plane. Using stochastic
modeling, geometric probability and numerical analysis techniques, we demonstrate a
novel approach to develop algorithms for finding locations in which circular disasters (of
particular radius) cause the expected most significant destruction, allowing to identify
locations which require additional protection efforts (e.g., equipment shielding). We also
provide an algorithm to assess the impact of a ‘random” circular disaster to the random
network. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to study such geographically
correlated failures in the context of spatial random networks. Before this work, that
was one of the most significant unstudied problems in the field, as similar problems for
deterministic networks was recently studied extensively.
1.2 Related Work
The issue of network survivability and resilience has been extensively studied in the past
(e.g., [25, 6, 19, 42, 26, 27, 12, 5] and references therein). However, Most of these works
concentrated on the logical network topology and did not consider the physical location
of nodes and links. When the logical (i.e., IP) topology is considered, wide-spread failures
have been extensively studied [18], [24]. Most of these works consider the topology of the
Internet as a random graph [5] and use percolation theory to study the effects of random
link and node failures on these graphs. These studies are motivated by failures of routers
due to attacks by viruses and worms rather than physical attacks.
4
Works that consider physical topology and fiber networks (e.g., [14], [27]), usually
focused on a small number of fiber failures (e.g., simultaneous failures of links sharing a
common physical resource, such as a cable, conduit, etc.). Such correlated link failures
are often addressed systematically by the concept of shared risk link group (SRLG) [21]
(see also section 1.1). Additional works explore dependent failures, but do not specifically
make use of the causes of dependence [23], [37], [39].
In contrast with these works, we focus on failures within a specific geographical region,
(e.g., failures caused by an EMP attack [17],[40]) implying that the failed components do
not necessarily share the same physical resource.
A closely related theoretical problem is the network inhibition problem [35], [36].
Under that problem, each edge in the network has a destruction cost, and a fixed budget
is given to attack the network. A feasible attack removes a subset of the edges, whose
total destruction cost is no greater than the budget. The objective is to find an attack
that minimizes the value of a maximum flow in the graph after the attack. However,
previous works dealing with this setting and its variants (e.g., [10], [36]) did not study
the removal of (geographically) neighboring links. Until the recent papers [31, 32, 33] by
Neumayer et al., perhaps the closest to this concept was the problem formulated in [7].
Similarly to deterministic networks, the subject of random networks and survivability
was well studied in the past (e.g. [5], [12], [24], [13]), most of these works model the
network as a random graph without considering the physical location of nodes and links,
and focus on the robustness of the graph’s structure, ignoring a physical embedment
in the plane. Some works considered geometry into the random model by considering
distances to the graph (e.g. [15]). However, previous works dealing with such models did
not study the removal of (geographically) neighboring links.
Recently, the subject of geographically correlated failures was proposed (e.g., [31, 32,
33]), where failures happens within a specific geographical region and span an extensive
geographic area, disrupting all physical network equipment within the affected region.
Novel works have been made recently to study the impact of various types of geograph-
ically correlated failures to a given deterministic network [33], [29], [30], [1], [1], [4], [3].
In these works various failure models were studied, mainly in the form of a circular re-
gion failures or line-segment failures, such that any station or fiber within or intersecting
the affected region is destroyed. Such failures were studied under the assumptions of
deterministic failures, as well as random failures (i.e. a circular region failure located
randomly over the map), and probabilistic failures (e.g. gives the ability to study cases
when a component’s failure probability is proportional to its distance from the attacked
point). While various failure models were studied in these works, in all of them, the
network’s layout is assumed to be deterministic, i.e. the geographical locations of nodes
and links are known. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to study such
geographically correlated failures in the context of spatial random networks.
We give a brief survey on works which are the most closest and relevant to our
work. Similarly to the failure model we study in our work, most of these works consider
a geographically correlated failure by a circular region of a specific radius (referred as
“circular cut”), or by a line-segment of specific length (referred as “line-segment cut”).
Such a cut destroys any station or fiber within or intersecting it. However, we note again,
in all these works, the subject network is deterministic and given.
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Figure 2: The fiber backbone operated by a major U.S. network provider [22] studied in
[31, 32, 33].
Deterministic Failures In [31, 32, 33] Neumayer et al. formulated the problem of
finding a location where a physical disaster or an attack on, will cause the most disruptive
impact on the network in terms of capacity, connectivity and flow criterions (termed by
them as the geographical network inhibition problem). They designed algorithms for
solving the problem, and demonstrated simulation results on a U.S infrastructure (see
Fig. 2). To the best of our knowledge, [31, 32, 33] were the first to study this problem. In
these works they studied the affect of circular cuts and line segments cuts under different
performance measures, in particular, provided polynomial time algorithms to find a worst-
case cut, that is a cut which maximizes/minimizes the value of the performance measure.
The performance measures of a cut, as studied in these works are:
• TEC - The total expected capacity of the intersected links with the cut.
• ATTR - The fraction of pairs of nodes that remain connected (also known as the
average two-terminal reliability of the network)
• MFST - The maximum flow between a given pair of nodes s and t.
• AMF - The average value of maximum flow between all pairs of nodes.
For performance measure TEC, the worst-case cut obtains a maximum value, while for
the rest, it obtains a minimum value.
We give illustrations from some of their simulation results on a U.S infrastructure
which are relevant to our simulation results further in this work (in section 4.3). Fig. 3
shows that TEC value is large in areas of high link density, such as areas in Florida, New
York, and around Dallas. Fig. 4 shows that cuts that minimize the MFST performance
measure between Los Angeles and NYC were found close to both to Los Angeles and
NYC, and the southwest area also appeared to be vulnerable. These results are relevant
to the simulation results for our model as shown in section 4.3
In [1] Agarwal et al. presented improved runtime algorithms to the problems presented
in [31, 32, 33] by the extensive use of tools from the field of computational geometry. In
addition, they study some extensions of these problems, such as allowingmultiple disasters
to happen simultaneously and provided an approximation algorithm for the problem of
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Figure 3: Line segments cuts of length approximately 120 miles optimizing TEC - the
red cuts maximize TEC and the black lines are nearly worst-case cuts. Taken from [33].
Figure 4: The impact of circular cuts of radius approximately 120 miles on the MFST
between Los Angeles and NYC. Red circles represent cuts that result in MFST = 0
and black circles result in MFST = 1. Cuts which intersect the nodes representing Los
Angeles or NYC are not shown. Taken from [33].
finding k points in which circular disasters (of particular radius) cause the most significant
destruction.
Random Failures In [29], [30] by Neumayer and Modiano, they develop tools to assess
the impact of a ‘random’ geographic disaster to a given network. They studied the impact
of both random circular cut (i.e. a circular region failure of particular radius located
randomly on the plane) and random line-segment cut.
The random location of the disaster can model failure resulting from a natural disaster
such as a hurricane or collateral non-targeted damage in an EMP attack.
Intuitively, the probability of a link to fail under a random cut is proportional to the
length of the link. They also compared independent failures versus failures correlated to
a random cut under the ATTR performance measure, assuming independent link failures
such that links fail with the same probability as in the random cut case. Thus the prob-
ability a link fails is still a function of its length, however links fail independently. Their
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Figure 5: The fiber backbone operated by a major U.S. network provider [9] and an
example of two attacks with probabilistic effects (the link colors represent their failure
probabilities). Taken from [4].
results shows that correlated failures (e.g., from a random circular cut) are fundamentally
different from independent failures.
In addition they showed simple insights about network design problems in the context
of random cuts. In the proposed problems the location of every node is fixed and the
goal is to find a set of links most robust to some metric under some constraints.
Probabilistic Failures An extensive work on the field of geographically correlated fail-
ures, generalizing previous work and providing interesting extensions was made recently
in [2, 4] by Agarwal et al. In these works they proposed a probabilistic failure model in
the context of geographically correlated failures. In this model an attack induces a spatial
probability distribution on the plane, specifying the damage probability at each location
(see Fig. 5). They consider probability functions which are non-increasing functions of
the distance between the epicenter and the component, assuming these functions have a
constant description complexity. Then, they develop fully polynomial time approxima-
tion schemes to obtain the expected vulnerability of the network in terms similar to the
TEC performance measure discussed earlier. Their algorithms also allow the assessment
of the effects of several simultaneous events. Another notable extension provided in these
works is the study of the vulnerability of compound components, that is a component
consists by a finite number of network components, allowing lightpaths investigation, by
noting a lightpath as a compound component comprised by a finite number of links.
Recently, Agarwal, Kaplan, and Sharir presented in [3] an improved runtime algo-
rithms to the algorithms presented in these works, as an outcome of their result in their
paper about the complexity of the union of ‘random Minkowski sums’ of s − gons and
disks (where the disks’ radius is a random non-negative number). The novel techniques
in these works are comprised with extensive use of tools from the field of computational
geometry. and in particular, theory of arrangements and randomized algorithms.
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Summary Summarizing the previous work in this emerging field of geographically cor-
related failures, we saw that when considering the network’s geographic layout to be
deterministic, various failure models were deeply studied in these works. In our work we
study the vulnerability of various spatial random network structures. That is networks
which their components’ locations (nodes and links) are probabilistically distributed on
the plane. Using stochastic modeling, geometric probability and numerical analysis tech-
niques, we develop a novel approach to develop an algorithm for finding locations in which
circular disasters (of particular radius) cause the expected most significant destruction.
We also provide an algorithm to assess the impact of a random circular disaster to the ran-
dom network. Before this work, that was one of the most significant unstudied problems
in the field, as similar problems for deterministic networks was recently studied exten-
sively. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to study such geographically
correlated failures in the context of spatial random networks.
2 Our Stochastic Model and Problem Formulation
We study the model consisting of a random network immersed within a bounded convex
set B ⊆ R2. We consider nodes as stations and links as cables that connect stations.
Stations are represented through their coordinates in the plane R2, and links are repre-
sented by straight line segments defined by their end-points. The network is formed by
a stochastic process in which the location of stations is determined by a stochastic point
process. The distribution of the Poisson process is determined by the intensity function
f(u) which represents the mean density of nodes in the neighborhood of u. The number
of nodes in a Borel set B follows a Poisson distribution with the parameter f(B), i.e.,
the integral over the intensity of all points in the Borel set. Furthermore, the number of
nodes in disjoint Borel sets are independent. An introduction to Poisson Point Processes
can be found in [38].
In our model we consider a network N = ((x′, y′) ∼ PPP (f()), link ∼ y(), c ∼
H(), Rec) where nodes are distributed in the rectangle Rec = [a, b]×[c, d] through a Spatial
Non-Homogeneous Poisson Point Process PPP (f()) where f() is the intensity function
of the PPP . Let y(pi, pj) be the probability for the event of existence of a link between
two nodes located at pi and pj in Rec. H(c, pi, pj) is the cumulative distribution function
of the link capacity between two connected nodes, i.e. P (Cij < c) = H(c, pi, pj) where pi
and pj are the locations of nodes i and j, respectively. It is reasonable to assume that
y(pi, pj) and H(c, pi, pj) can be computed easily as a function of the distance from pi to pj
and that the possible capacity between them is bounded (denoted bymax{capacity}). We
assume the following: the intensity function f of the PPP , y, and the probability density
function h (the derivative of H), are functions of constant description complexity. They
are continuously differentiable and Riemann-integrable over Rec, which also implies that
our probability functions are of bounded variation over Rec, as their derivatives receive
a maximum over the compact set Rec ⊆ R2.
We note that Poisson process is memoryless and independent, in particular, if we look
on a specific region with high intensity values then it is likely to have multiple stations in
this region. However, by our assumptions, it is reasonable that if a disaster destroys some
nodes in a region, then it is highly likely that it destroys other nodes located nearby in
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Figure 6: Example of a circular cut D with TEC of
11∑
i=1
ci. The green, blue and red links
depicts the different intersected-link types: α− link, β − link, and γ − link respectively
(as defined in section 3.1). The black links are not affected by D.
this region. There are various point process models that can be used to model a random
network, for example, Mate´rn hard-core process and Gibbs point processes class [38],
which can be used where it is wanted that a random point is less likely to occur at the
location u if there are many points in the neighborhood of u or for the hard-core process
where a point u is either “permitted” or “not permitted” depending whether it satisfies
the hard-core requirement (e.g. far enough from all other points). Methods similar to
those presented here for the Poisson process can be applied to these models, as well.
Definition 2.1 (Circular Cut). A circular cut D, is a circle within Rec determined by its
center point p = (xk, yk) and by it’s radius r, where p ∈ Recr = [a+r, b−r]× [c+r, d−r].
1 We sometimes denote the cut as cut(p, r) and Recr as Rec (depending on the context).
Such a cut destroys all fibers (links) that intersect it (including the interior of the circle).
Our goal is to assess the vulnerability of the network to circular attacks (cuts). We
consider a fiber to be destroyed (failed fiber) if it intersects the cut (including the interior
of the circle), namely, the attack’s influence region. The impact is measured by the
total expected capacity of the intersected links (TEC), or by the total expected number
of intersected links, which is equivalent to the previous measure when all fibers have
capacity 1 (see illustration in Fig. 6). This will be done in three manners:
1. Provide an algorithm for evaluating the total expected capacity of the intersected
links (TEC) of the network with a circular attack in a specific location.
2. Provide an algorithm for finding an attack location (or a set of locations) which has
the highest expected impact on the network, that is, a worst case attack (one with
the highest TEC value).
3. Provide an algorithm to assess the expected impact on the network from a random
circular attack (such that the attack’s location is probabilistically distributed).
The first is done in section 3, the second and third in section 4.
1For simplicity we assume that D can only appear in whole within Rec.
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Figure 7: α− link edge illustration
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Figure 8: β − link edge illustration
p
u
v
D
Rec(a, d) (b, d)
(a, c) (b, c)
Figure 9: γ − link edge illustration
3 Damage Evaluation Scheme
3.1 General Idea
We develop a scheme to evaluate the total expected capacity of the intersected links
(TEC) of the network with a circular attack in a specific location. This, will be useful for
the developing an algorithm that finds the attacks that have the highest expected impact
on the network, as described in section 4. First, we present the general idea behind it.
We divide the intersection of a cut D (denoted also by cut(p, r)) with a graph’s edges
into 3 independent types:
• α − link, is the case where the entire edge is inside cut(p, r), which means both
endpoints of the edge are inside cut(p, r) (see illustration in Fig. 7).
• β− link, is the case where one endpoint of the edge is inside cut(p, r) and the other
endpoint is outside of cut(p, r) (see illustration in Fig. 8).
• γ − link, is the case where both endpoints are outside of cut(p, r) and the edge
which connects the endpoints intersects cut(p, r) (see illustration in Fig. 9).
Note that any intersected link with cut D = cut(p, r) belongs to exactly one of the
above types. Fig. 6 depicts a circular cut with the different types of intersected links. For
σ ∈ {α, β, γ}, let Xσ be the total capacity of all the intersected σ− link type edges with
cut D, namely the damage determined by σ − links. Thus, it holds that the expected
11
capacity of the intersected links of types α, β and γ is determined by:
E[Xα] =
1
2
∫∫
D
∫∫
D
f(u)f(v)g(u, v) dudv (1)
E[Xβ] =
∫∫
Rec−D
∫∫
D
f(u)f(v)g(u, v) dudv (2)
E[Xγ ] =
1
2
∫∫
Rec−D
∫∫
Rec−D
f(u)f(v)g(u, v)I(u, v,D) dudv (3)
where g(u, v) = y(u, v)
∫max{capacity}
0
h(c, u, v)c dc is the expected capacity between two
nodes at points u and v (determined by the probability of having a link between them,
times the expected capacity of this link). I(u, v,D) is the indicator function, giving one
if the segment (u, v) intersects the circle D and zero otherwise.
Denote by X = Xα + Xβ + Xγ , the total damage determined by all the intersected
links with cut D. Due to the linearity of expectation, we get that the total expected
capacity of the intersected links (TEC) is E[X ] = E[Xα] + E[Xβ] + E[Xγ]. Hence,
it is sufficient to evaluate the expected damage caused by each of the 3 types of the
intersected links separately. Summing them all together is the total expected damage
caused by D = cut(p, r).
3.2 Evaluating the Damage of a Circular Cut Algorithm
We present an approximation algorithm EDCC (see pseudo-code in Algorithm 1) for
evaluating the total expected capacity of the intersected links (TEC) of the network with
a circular attack (cut) D in a specific location. Later, we use this algorithm to find attack
locations with the (approximately) highest expected impact on the network. We give
two different approximation analyses for algorithm EDCC output. One is an additive
approximation, and one is multiplicative. Although additive approximations in general
are better than multiplicative, our analysis of the additive approximation depends on
the maximum value of the functions f(·) and g(·, ·) over Rec, where g(·, ·) stands for
the expected capacity between two points u, v ∈ Rec. While the maximum of f(·) and
g(·, ·) over Rec can be high and affect the running time of the algorithm, for practical
uses on ”real-life” network it is usually low enough to make the running time reasonable.
The multiplicative analysis which does not depend on the maximum of f(·) and g(·, ·)
over Rec, depends on the variation bound of f(·)f(·)g(·, ·), namely a constant M which
is an upper bound for the derivative of f(·)f(·)g(·, ·) over Rec. Define an additive ǫ-
approximation to the TEC as a quantity C˜ satisfying C− ǫ ≤ C˜ ≤ C+ ǫ for ǫ > 0, where
C is the actual expected capacity intersecting the cut. Similarly, define a multiplicative
ǫ, ε-approximation to the cut capacity as a quantity C˜ satisfying (1 − ε)C − ǫ ≤ C˜ ≤
(1 + ε)C + ǫ.
The algorithm uses numerical integration based on the division of Rec into squares of
edge length ∆ (we refer to ∆ as the “grid constant”). The different approximations are
pronounced in the ComputeGrid(Rec, r, ǫ) function in the algorithm, which determines
the grid of constant ∆. Let Grid be the set of these squares center-points. The algorithm
evaluates the integrals numerically, using the points in Grid. Intuitively: the denser is the
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Algorithm 1: EvaluateDamageCircularCut (EDCC): Approximation algorithm for
evaluating the damage of a circular cut.
1: capacity procedure EDCC(N, cut(p, r), ǫ)
2: D ← Circle(cut(p, r)) //D is a representation of the circular cut.
3: Grid← ComputeGrid(Rec, r, ǫ)
4: for every u, v ∈ Grid do
5: // Compute the expected capacity between two points u and v:
g(u, v)← y(u, v) ∫max{capacity}
0
h(c, u, v)c dc
6: The following steps are calculated over Grid:
7: E[Xα]← 12
∫∫
D
∫∫
D
f(u)f(v)g(u, v) dudv
8: E[Xβ]←
∫∫
Rec−D
∫∫
D
f(u)f(v)g(u, v) dudv
9: E[Xγ ]← 12
∫∫
Rec−D
f(u)evaluateGamma(u,D,Grid) du
10: return E[Xα] + E[Xβ] + E[Xγ ]
Procedure evaluateGamma(u,D,Grid)
11: Create two tangents t1, t2 to D going out from u.
12: Denote by Ku the set of points which is bounded by t1, t2, D and the boundary of
the rectangle Rec (see Fig. 10).
13: return
∫∫
Ku
f(v)g(u, v) dv
grid, the more accurate the results, at the price of requiring additional time to complete.
In section 3.3 we examine the relation between the accuracy parameter ǫ and the grid
constant ∆, this relation determines the implementation of ComputeGrid(Rec, r, ǫ) and
the running time of our algorithm.
When computing the expectation of the γ-links damage caused by a cut D, we use
the following lemma:
Lemma 3.1. For every node u ∈ Rec \ D, the set Ku (see lines 11-12 in Algorithm 1
and illustration in Fig. 10) satisfies: for every v ∈ Ku, (u, v) intersects D, and for every
w ∈ Rec \ (Ku ∪D), (u, w) does not intersect with D.
Proof. The set, Au bounded by both tangents and the boundary of the rectangle, contain-
ing the circle, is convex, as it is the intersection of convex sets (a triangle and a rectangle).
This set, minus the union of radii from the center of the circle to both tangents is a dis-
connected set. The point u belongs to the connected set containing u, whereas the point
v belongs to the connected set Ku, which is is separated from u by the union of radii.
That is, any path between u and v contained in the convex set Au, must intersect with
the union of radii, and thus with the circle.
For any point p ∈ Rec which is not on the tangents’ rays, the line segment (u, p) is
either completely inside Au or completely in Rec \Au (except for point u). For any point
w1 ∈ Rec \ Au, since Au is bounded by the rays from u which are tangent to the circle,
it follows that the segment (u, w1) is completely outside Au (except u), and thus does
not intersect with the circle. The set Su = Au \ (Ku ∪D) is a star domain, such that for
any point w2 ∈ Su the segment (u, w2) is completely contained in Su, and thus does not
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Figure 10: The area Ku of the shadow by the circular cut from the point u.
intersect with the circle.
Thus, we run over every point u in Grid which is outside the cut, and compute all
possible γ-link damage emanating from u, using procedure evaluateGamma(u,D,Grid).
Summing them all together and dividing by 2, due to double-counting, we get the total
expected γ-link damage.
3.3 Numerical Accuracy and Running Time Analysis
3.3.1 Geometric Preliminaries
In this section we give theorems regarding the accuracy and the running time of Algo-
rithm 1 (EDCC). The first theorem is in section 3.3.2, gives an additive bound on the er-
ror in the calculation of the damage caused by a cut of radius r using numerical integration
with grid constant ∆. This gives us the relation between the accuracy parameter ǫ and
the grid constant ∆. This relation gives the implementation of ComputeGrid(Rec, r, ǫ)
in O(1) by choosing ∆ small enough such that the error will be not more than ǫ. Then,
in Theorem 3.5 we give a bound on the running time of the algorithm for any accuracy
parameter ǫ > 0.
In section 3.3.3, we give a combined multiplicative and additive bound on the error
for a grid constant ∆, which is different from the additive bound by being independent
on the maxima of the functions f and g, thus, for a given accuracy parameters ε, ǫ, one
can choose ∆ which is independent on the maxima of the functions f and g, small enough
such that the error will be not more than (1 + ε)C + ǫ, where C is the actual TEC of
the cut. With this multiplicative-additive approximation we can bound the running time
independently on the maxima of the functions f and g, useful for the case these maxima
are high (usually in ”real-life” networks it is not the case and the additive approximation
will have a reasonable running time, as described in section 3.2).
We restrict our results to the case where ∆ < r/2, as otherwise the approximation is
too crude to consider.
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Figure 11: t1 and t2 are tangents to a circle of radius ∆ centered at u and to the circular
cut. The colored areas depicts the extremum of difference for possible γ-links endpoints
emanating from a point within the circle centered at u at one side of the cut.
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Figure 12: The area in grey depicts the extremum of difference for possible γ-links end-
points emanating from a point within the circle centered at u at one side of the cut.
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Figure 13: The perpendicular tangents from a point u on the circular cut and from a
point v at distance 2∆ from the circular cut. The area in grey depicts the extremum of
difference for possible γ-links endpoints emanating from u and v at one side of the cut.
Some technical results are needed for proving the theorems in this section. We first
notice that, given a point u at a distance d from a circular cut, and a point v at a
distance ∆ from u, the difference between the area of endpoints of γ-links starting at
point u to those starting at point v is bounded in the area between (a) the segment from
u to the boundary of Rec tangent to the cut (b) the segment from v to the boundary of
Rec tangent to the cut (c) the boundary of Rec. Plus the area bounded by (a), (b) and
the boundary of the circular cut. Furthermore, the extrema of the area of difference are
obtained in the cases where the segment from v to the boundary of Rec tangent to the
cut is also tangent to the circle centered at u with radius ∆. See Fig. 11 and 12.
For an accurate numeric bound of the error in the theorems of this section, one should
add a factor of 2 to the results of the following lemmas (to bound also the area of possible
γ-links endpoints obtained by the additional tangents emanating from u and v to the other
side of the circular cut).
Lemma 3.2. The area bounded by (a) the tangent at a point u on the circumference of
the circular cut (b) the tangent to the cut from any point v at distance 2∆ from u (c)
the circumference of the cut and (d) the boundary of Rec, is bounded by c
√
∆ for some
constant c. See Fig. 13.
Proof. The extremum of the difference between the two tangents is when the tangent to
the circle is also a tangent to the circle of radius 2∆ centered at u, i.e., when the segment
of length 2∆ starting at point u is perpendicular to the tangent at its other endpoint, v.
See Fig. 13.
Let q be the point of intersection of the second tangent and the circular cut, and let
w be the point of intersection between the two tangents. Let p be the center of the circle.
We have ∠upw = ∠wpq = α and angle ∠uwv = 2α.
Let b = d(u, w) = d(w, q) and d(w, v) = a =
√
b2 − 4∆2. We have tanα = b/r, where
r is the radius of the circle, and tan 2α =
2∆√
b2 − 4∆2 . Using tan 2α = 2 tanα/(1−tan
2 α)
one obtains b2 = (∆2r2 + ∆r3)/(r2 − ∆2). Thus, r∆ ≤ b2 ≤ 2r∆. Assume that both
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tangents hit the same side of Rec, the area of the triangle bounded by both tangents and
the boundary of Rec is bounded by
1
2
D2 sin 2α ≤ D2 sinα ≤ D2 tanα ≤ D2
√
2∆
r
, (4)
where D is the diagonal of Rec. Now, if the tangents hit different sides of Rec, there are
two cases:
If they hit perpendicular sides, then the area bounded by them and the sides is a
quadrangle, taking a line segment from the corner point of Rec which is the intersection
of the perpendicular sides to w we triangulate this area, obtaining two triangles. The
angle, near point w of each triangle is bounded by 2α which is bounded by π/2, since we
assume ∆ < r/2. Thus from (4) the area is bounded by 2D2
√
2∆
r
.
If the tangents hit parallel sides we can triangulate the area bounded by them and the
sides, by taking two line segments from the corners of Rec within this area to the point
w, obtaining three triangles. Using similar arguments as the previous case, we obtain
that the area is bounded by 3D2
√
2∆
r
.
Finally, the area bounded by the segments uw and wq and the circular arc uq is
bounded by the area of triangle △uwq, which, in turn is bounded by b2 ≤ 2r∆ ≤
D2
√
2∆
r
.
Lemma 3.3. For a point u at a distance d from a circular cut cut(p, r) and a given
∆ > 0, the area between the circumference of the cut, the boundary of Rec, the tangent
to the cut from u and the tangent to the cut from a point v located at a distance ∆ from
u is bounded by c
√
∆ for some constant c. See Fig. 12.
Proof. Let w be the point of intersection between the two tangents (from point u to the
cut and from point v to the cut). We have sin(∠uwv) = ∆/(
√
(r + d)2 − r2 + b), where
b is the distance between the point of intersection of each of the tangents with the cut
and the point w. we have sin(∠uwv) = ∆/(
√
2rd+ d2 + b).
Now for d < ∆ the point v is located within a distance of d + ∆ < 2∆ from the
circumference of the cut, and the Lemma follows from Lemma 3.2.
If d > ∆ we have sin(∠uwv) < ∆/(
√
2rd) < ∆/(
√
2r∆). Thus, if the tangents hit
the same side of Rec the triangular area between the tangents and the side is bounded
by D2√∆/r, where D is the diagonal of Rec.
If the tangents hit different sides, then we can triangulate the area bounded by them
and the sides similarly as in Lemma 3.2. Denote by α = ∠uwv the angle between the two
tangents. For each triangle, the angle near point w is bounded by α which is bounded
by π/2 (since we assume ∆ < r/2). Thus, the area bounded by the tangents and Rec
(which is not containing the circle) is bounded by 3D2√∆/r.
Similarly to Lemma 3.2 the area between the two tangents and the circle is also
bounded by b2 sin(π − ∠uwv) = b2 sin(∠uwv) <
√
2r3∆, as b < r since both tangents
intersect the same quadrant of the cut.
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3.3.2 Additive Approximation
Theorem 3.4. For a grid of constant ∆, a point p ∈ Rec, and the result C˜ for cut(p, r)
obtained by Algorithm 1, it holds that C−ǫ < C˜ < C+ǫ, where C is the actual TEC value
for cut(p, r), and ǫ = c0 ·
√
∆ for some constant c0 > 0 that depends on the maximum
values of f(·) and g(·, ·), their variation bound, the sides of Rec and the radius r.
Proof. By standard arguments on numerical integration the error in calculating the inte-
gral over any region is bounded by M∆ times the area of integration (that is bounded by
the area of Rec, |Rec|), where M is a bound on the variation rate for f(·), g(·), and the
product f(·)f(·)g(·, ·) over Rec. Additionally, the cumulative error value |C− C˜| consists
of the following:
Any point in a grid square is within a distance of ∆/
√
2 < ∆ of the grid point
(square center). The additional difference in the integral over α and β links is bounded
by the integral over the area of inaccuracy around the circular cut (grid squares which
are partially in the cut and partially outside). This is bounded by an annulus of radii[
r −∆/√2, r +∆/√2] around the center of the circular cut of area 2√2πr∆. Thus,
we obtain an error which is bounded by 2
√
2πr∆T |Rec|, where T is a bound on the
maximum value of f(·), g(·), and the product f(·)f(·)g(·, ·) over Rec.
The additional error is in the calculation of γ-links, and obtained in three terms,
one term is determined in the procedure evaluateGamma(u,D,Grid) where the area of
inaccuracy is around Ku (grid squares which are partially in Ku and partially outside).
This area is bounded by 2
√
2D∆ where D is the diagonal length of Rec. This gives an
error term which is bounded by 2
√
2D∆T |Rec|.
The second error term in the γ-links calculations is obtained by considering the
change in the functions f(u) w.r.t f(w), and g(u, ·) w.r.t g(w, ·) in Ku ∩ Kw, for a
point w within distance ∆ from u. For convenience, for a point u, denote f˜u(v) =
f(u)f(v)g(u, v). Taking into account the change in the integrated function f˜u(v) and
fw(v) over Ku∩Kw, for a point w within distance ∆ from u, we obtain an error, bounded
by
∫∫
Ku∩Kw
(
f˜u(v) +M∆
)
dv− ∫∫
Ku∩Kw
f˜u(v) dv ≤
∫∫
Ku∩Kw
M∆ dv ≤M∆|Rec|. Thus, obtaining
an error bounded by ∆M |Rec|2.
The third, and the most significant error term, is obtained using Lemma 3.3 which
implies that for any point u ∈ Rec \ D in a grid square (except grid squares which are
partially in D and partially outside), the area of symmetric difference between Ku and
Kw for the grid point (square center) w nearest to u (such that the euclidean distance
d(u, w) < ∆) is bounded by a
√
∆, where a is some constant (see section 3.3.1), depending
on the radius of the cut r and the sides of the rectangle Rec. Thus, we obtain an error
bounded by a|Rec|T√∆.
Taking into account the errors in this numerical integration from all terms above, one
obtains that the leading term in the error, as ∆ → 0, is |C − C˜| ≤ constD2|Rec|T
√
∆
r
,
where D is the diagonal length of Rec (see section 3.3.1). Thus, the accuracy depends on√
∆, as well as on the sides of the rectangle, the radius of the cut, the maxima of f(·),
g(·, ·) and their variation bound in Rec.
Using Theorem 3.4 and the given in section 3.3.1, the function ComputeGrid(Rec, r, ǫ)
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in the algorithm can be implemented by selecting the value of ∆ guaranteeing that the
additive error will be at most ǫ.
We now give a bound on the running time of the EDCC algorithm for any additive
accuracy parameter ǫ > 0.
Theorem 3.5. For a Rec of area A with diagonal length D, attack of radius r, and an
additive accuracy parameter ǫ > 0, the total running time of Algorithm 1 (EDCC) is
O
(
A10D16T 8
ǫ8r4
+
A10T 4M4
ǫ4
)
, where T is a bound on the maximum value of f(·), g(·),
and the product f(·)f(·)g(·, ·) over Rec, and M is a bound on the variation rate for these
functions over Rec.
Proof. The algorithm is based on performing numerical integration over pairs of grid
points (square-center points). The denser is the grid, the more pairs of points we have
in the grid, thus the running time is determined by the grid constant ∆ (the squares’
side length) which is set by ComputeGrid(Rec, r, ǫ) function at the beginning of the
algorithm. The number of grid points in the rectangle is A/∆2. Thus the running time
is at most proportional to the number of pairs of grid points, which is O (A2/∆4).
Now, from the given in section 3.3.1 and the proof of Theorem 3.4 we obtain that as
∆→ 0
ǫ = O
(
D2AT
√
∆
r
+∆MA2
)
Thus, when M = O
(D4T 2
ǫr
)
(reasonable in practical usages), ∆ = Ω
(
ǫ2r
D4A2T 2
)
, and
the total running time of the algorithm is
O
(
A2/∆4
)
= O
(
A10D16T 8
ǫ8r4
)
.
Otherwise, if M = ω
(D4T 2
ǫr
)
, we obtain that ∆ = Ω
( ǫ
MA2
)
, and the running time of
the algorithm is
O
(
A10M4
ǫ4
)
.
3.3.3 Multiplicative Approximation
Since the constant in Theorem 3.4 depends on the maximum value of the functions f
and g, which may be undesirable in case these maxima are high, we have the following
theorem, giving a combined additive and multiplicative accuracy with the constants in-
dependent of the maxima of f and g. Using the following Theorem 3.6, the function
ComputeGrid(Rec, r, ǫ) can be modified to a new function ComputeGrid(Rec, r, ǫ, ε)
which can be implemented by selecting the value of ∆ guaranteeing that the additive
error will be at most ǫ and the multiplicative error will be at most ε, as described in the
following theorem.
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Theorem 3.6. For a grid of constant ∆, a point p ∈ Rec, and the result C˜ for D =
cut(p, r) obtained by Algorithm 1, it holds that (1 − ε)C − ǫ < C˜ < (1 + ε)C + ǫ, where
C is the actual TEC value for cut(p, r), for ǫ = c1 ·
√
∆, ε = c2 ·
√
∆, such that c1 and c2
depend only on Rec, r, and M the bound on the variation of f(·), g(·), and f(·)f(·)g(·, ·)
over Rec, but are independent on their maximum values.
Proof. From the proof of Theorem 3.4, the standard error in the numerical integration
over the grid depends only on the grid constant ∆, the radius of the cut r, and the
bounded variation rate M of the integrated function.
For a point u ∈ Rec \ D and the closest grid point w ∈ Rec \ D nearest to u (with
a distance at most ∆ from each other), denote by R′ the segment of the tangent going
out from u to one side of D within Rec, similarly, denote by R the segment of the
tangent going out from w to the same side of D within Rec. Denote by R(x) the point
on R with coordinate x, and similarly for R′(x), where the x-axis is taken to be the
line that does not intersect with D and going through the angle bisector for the angle
between R and R′ 2. By the proof of Lemma 3.3 we obtain that the euclidean distance
||R′(x)− R(x)|| satisfies ||R′(x)− R(x)|| < a√∆ for any x ∈ Rec, where a is a constant
depending on the sides of Rec (see section 3.3.1), this is obtained directly from the proof
of Lemma 3.3 by using similarity of triangles properties. For convenience, for a point
u, denote f˜u(v) = f(u)f(v)g(u, v), and write it in Cartesian coordinates fu(x, y) (with
respect to the axis described above). The TEC from β − links and γ − links going out
from w is bounded by
∫∫
Ku∪D
f˜u(x, y) dxdy +
∫
dx
R(x)∫
R(x)−a√∆
(
f˜u(x, y) +M(a
√
∆+∆)
)
dy,
thus, the difference between the TEC values of β − links and γ − links emanating from
u to β − links and γ − links emanating from w is bounded by
∫ R(x)∫
R(x)−a
√
∆
(
f˜u(v) +M
√
∆(a +
√
∆)
)
dxdy (5)
Taking strips of length a
√
∆ we obtain the following:
∫ R(x)∫
R(x)−a√∆
(
f˜u(v) +M
√
∆(a+
√
∆)
)
dxdy ≤
∫ R(x)−a√∆∫
R(x)−2a√∆
(
f˜u(v) +M
√
∆(2a +
√
∆)
)
dxdy
≤
∫ R(x)−2a√∆∫
R(x)−3a
√
∆
(
f˜u(v) +M
√
∆(3a+
√
∆)
)
dxdy ≤ · · · (6)
2There are two pairs of vertical angels by formed by the intersection of R with R′ and thus, two angle
bisectors, the angle bisector of one pair is intersecting the cut and the other does not intersecting the
cut, we refer to the pair of which their angle bisector does not intersect the cut.
20
Note that ∫∫
Ku∪D
f˜u(x, y) dxdy ≥
∫ R(x)∫
R(x)−2r
f˜u(v) dxdy (7)
Thus, when integrating over Ku∪D by summing integrations of strips with length a
√
∆,
at least
2r
a
√
∆
such strips are needed.
Now taking the average of the sequence (6) of length
2r
a
√
∆
(note that we allow fraction
of an element, e.g., the sequence can be a less than one long) and from (7) we obtain that
the difference between the TEC values (given in 5) is bounded by
a
√
∆
2r

∫∫
Ku∪D
f˜u(x, y) dxdy +
∫ R(x)∫
R(x)−a√∆
M
√
∆(a+
√
∆) dxdy
+ · · ·+
∫ R(x)∫
R(x)−2r
M
√
∆(
2r
a
√
∆
a+
√
∆) dxdy


≤ a
√
∆
2r
∫∫
Ku∪D
f˜u(x, y) dxdy + aMD
√
∆(r + a
√
∆+∆), (8)
where D is the diagonal length of Rec.
Thus, in leading terms, as ∆ → 0, we obtain an error with multiplicative factor
a
2r
√
∆ and an additive term of aMrD√∆ between the two TEC values. Using similar
techniques, one can bound the error obtained by the areas of inaccuracy:
(i) Grid squares that are partially in cut D and partially outside. This error can
be bounded using similar methods when representing the integrated function in polar
coordinates with respect to the center of D. Since this area is bounded by an annulus
of radii
[
r −∆/√2, r +∆/√2] around the center of D, we can take strips of length ∆.
Thus, this can be bounded by a multiplicative factor of b∆ and additive term of c∆ for
b and c which are depended linearly on the radius r.
(ii) For a node u ∈ Rec\D, grid squares that are partially in Ku and partially outside.
This area is bounded by 2
√
2D∆. Thus, using similar methods, we can take strips of
length ∆, obtaining an error bounded by a multiplicative factor of b′∆ and additive term
c′∆, for b′ and c′ which are depended linearly on D.
Overall, the total accumulated error obtained by the modified Algorithm 1, in lead-
ing terms as ∆ → 0, is with multiplicative factor a|Rec|
2r
√
∆ and an additive term of
aMrD|Rec|√∆, where a ≤ constD2 1√
r
(see section 3.3.1).
The following theorem gives a bound on the running time of the modified EDCC
algorithm, independent of the maxima of f and g.
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Theorem 3.7. For a Rec of area A with diagonal length D, attack of radius r, a mul-
tiplicative accuracy parameter ε > 0 and an additive accuracy parameter ǫ > 0, the total
running time of the modified Algorithm 1 (EDCC) is O
(
A10D16
ε8r12
+
A10D24M8
ǫ8r4
)
where
M is a bound on the variation rate of f(·), g(·), and the product f(·)f(·)g(·, ·) over Rec.
Proof. As described in the proof of Theorem 3.5, the number of grid points in the rectangle
is A/∆2. Thus the running time is at most proportional to the number of pairs of grid
points, which is O (A2/∆4).
From the proof of Theorem 3.6, we obtain that as ∆→ 0
ε = O
(D2A2
r1.5
√
∆
)
,
ǫ = O
(
M
√
rD3A
√
∆
)
.
Thus, if ∆ = Ω
(
ε2r3
D4A2
)
, the total running time of the algorithm is
O
(
A2/∆4
)
= O
(
A10D16
ε8r12
)
.
Otherwise, ∆ = Ω
(
ǫ2r
M2D6A2
)
and the total running time of the algorithm is
O
(
A10D24M8
ǫ8r4
)
.
4 Find Sensitive Locations Scheme
4.1 Sensitivity Map for Circular Attacks and Maximum Impact
In the previous section we showed how to evaluate the damage of a cut D in a specific
location. Using Algorithm 1 (EDCC) one can approximate the TEC for a circular attack
at every point, and in particular, find an approximated worst case attack (one with the
highest TEC value).
To achieve this goal, we divide Rec into squares, forming a grid. Then, we execute
EDCC algorithm from the previous section for every grid point (squares center-points)
such that it is a center-point of a circular cut of radius r. This leads to a “network
sensitivity map”, i.e., for every point we have an approximation of the damage by a
possible attack in that point.
The approximated worst cut is given by taking the point with the highest TEC value
among all the centers of grid squares. The actual worst case cut can be potentially located
at any point within the grid squares whose centers’ calculated TECs are approximated
by the EDCC algorithm. To guarantee an attack location with TEC of at least C − ǫ
where C is the TEC of the actual worst cut and an accuracy parameter ǫ > 0, we provide
algorithm FSL (see pseudo-code in Algorithm 2).
We now prove the correctness of Algorithm 2 (FSL).
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Algorithm 2: FindSenstiveLocations (FSL): Approximation algorithm for the net-
work sensitivity map under a circular attack
1: For a network N , a cut of radius r, and accuracy parameter ǫ > 0 , apply the
function computeGrid(Rec, r, ǫ/2) to find ∆ > 0 such that the accuracy of
Algorithm 1, given by Theorem 3.4 is ǫ/2.
2: Form a grid of constant ∆ (found in step 1) from Rec. For every grid point p, apply
procedure EDCC(N, cut(p, r), ǫ/2). The grid point with the highest calculated
TEC is the center of the approximated worst cut.
Theorem 4.1. For an accuracy parameter ǫ > 0, the attack with the highest TEC value
C˜ found by the above algorithm satisfies C˜ ≥ C − ǫ, where C is the TEC value for the
actual worst cut.
Proof. By Theorem 3.4 for every ǫ′ > 0 one can find a grid constant ∆ > 0 such that for
any point p ∈ Rec the TEC value of cut(p, r) obtained by algorithm EDCC is within
ǫ′-accuracy (additive) from the actual TEC value of cut(p, r).
For any cut located at a grid point, take a cut located at some other point within the
grid square, so it is within a distance d < ∆ from the center of the square. The difference
between the TEC for these two cases is exactly the same as in the symmetric case, where
the functions f , g and the grid, are shifted a distance d in the other direction. Thus,
using similar arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3.4, we obtain that the difference is
at most ǫ′. Taking ǫ′ = ǫ/2 completes the proof.
The following theorem determines the running time of Algorithm 4.2 for an additive
accuracy parameter ǫ > 0.
Theorem 4.2. For a Rec of area A with diagonal length D, attack of radius r, and
an additive accuracy parameter ǫ > 0, the total running time of Algorithm 2 (FSL)
is O
(
A15D24T 12
ǫ12r6
+
A15M6
ǫ6
)
, where T = maxu,v∈Rec {f(u)f(v)g(u, v)}, and M is the
supremum on the variation rate of f(·)f(·)g(·, ·) over Rec.
Proof. The algorithm first determines a grid constant ∆ such that the accuracy of Al-
gorithm 1, given by Theorem 3.4 is ǫ/2. Then samples a circular cut of radius r at
the center point p of each grid square. For each such cut, the algorithm executes
EDCC(N, cut(p, r), ǫ/2) in O(A2/∆4) time. The grid has O (A/∆2) points. Thus the
total running time is at most O (A3/∆6).
Now, from the proof of Theorem 3.5 we obtain that when M = O
(D4T 2
ǫr
)
,
∆ = Ω
(
ǫ2r
D4A2T 2
)
,
and thus, the total running time of the algorithm is
O(A3/∆6) = O
(
A15D24T 12
ǫ12r6
)
.
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Otherwise, if M = ω
(D4T 2
ǫr
)
, we obtain that ∆ = Ω
( ǫ
MA2
)
, and the running time of
the algorithm is O
(
A15M6
ǫ6
)
.
Algorithm 2 can be modified to give a multiplicative approximation which is in-
dependent of the maxima of f and g (over Rec), by using the modified function
computeGrid(Rec, r, ǫ/2, ε/2) and the modified EDCC algorithm (as described in sec-
tion 3.3.3). The correctness of this algorithm is obtained similarly as in Theorem 4.1.
For the running time we provide the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3. For a Rec of area A with diagonal length D, attack of radius r, a mul-
tiplicative accuracy parameter ε > 0 and an additive accuracy parameter ǫ > 0, the total
running time of the modified FSL algorithm is O
(
A15D36M12
ǫ12r6
+
A15D24
ε12r18
)
, where M is
a bound on the variation rate of f(·), g(·), and the product f(·)f(·)g(·, ·) over Rec.
Proof. As described in Theorem 4.2, the total running time is at most O (A3/∆6). Now,
for the modified EDCC algorithm described in section 3.3.3, we obtain by the proof
of Theorem 3.7 that the grid constant ∆ satisfies ∆ = Ω
(
ε2r3
D4A2
)
or (the asymptotic
minimum) ∆ = Ω
(
ǫ2r
M2D6A2
)
Thus, the total running time of the modified FSL algorithm is
O
(
A15D36M12
ǫ12r6
+
A15D24
ε12r18
)
.
4.2 Random Attacks
The impact of a random circular cut to deterministic network was recently studied (see
section 1.2). The random location of a disaster can model failure resulting from a natural
disaster such as a hurricane or collateral (non-targeted) damage in an EMP attack. An
interesting question is to evaluate the expected impact of a random circular cut to our
stochastic network model.
Algorithm 1 (EDCC) gives an approximation for the expected damage caused by a
circular cut which is located at a specific point. We can use it to develop an algorithm
for evaluating the damage caused by a random circular cut, using a similar concept as in
Algorithm 2 (FSL).
For a random circular cut distributed uniformly over Rec, an additive approximation
of the expected damage caused by such a random cut to our stochastic network model is
given by
1
|Rec|
∫∫
Rec
EDCC(N, cut(p, r), ǫ′) dp. (9)
24
Algorithm 3: RandomCircularCutEvaluation (RCCE): Approximation algorithm
for evaluating the expected damage caused by a random circular attack.
1: For a random network N , a random cut of radius r, distributed uniformly over Rec,
and an additive accuracy parameter ǫ > 0, apply the function
computeGrid(Rec, r, ǫ/2) to find ∆ > 0 such that the accuracy of Algorithm 1,
given by Theorem 3.4 is ǫ/2.
2: Form a grid of constant ∆ (found in step 1) from Rec. Denote by Grid the set
of grid points (square centers).
3: return 1|Rec|
∑
p∈GridEDCC(N, cut(p, r), ǫ/2)
For a given additive accuracy parameter ǫ > 0, the idea is to evaluate the above equation
numerically over a grid, with a grid constant ∆ small enough, and an appropriate ǫ′, such
that the total additive error will be at most ǫ. This is provided in Algorithm RCCE (see
pseudo-code in Algorithm 3).
Similarly as in Algorithm 2 (FSL), by the proof of Theorem 4.1, we obtain that the
grid constant ∆, chosen in Algorithm 3 guarantees that for two cuts of radius r, located
at points u and v within euclidean distance at most ∆ from each other, the difference in
the TEC value for these two cuts is at most ǫ. Thus, when evaluating (9) numerically
in Algorithm 3, the total error is at most
1
|Rec| · |Rec| · ǫ = ǫ. Thus, the correctness
of Algorithm 3 is obtained similarly as for the FSL algorithm, given by Theorem 4.1.
The running time of Algorithm 3 is also the same as for the FSL algorithm, given by
Theorem 4.2.
Using the multiplicative approximation with the modified EDCC algorithm and the
modified function computeGrid(Rec, r, ǫ/2, ε/2) (as described in section 3.3.3), a similar
result with running time as in Theorem 4.3 can be obtained for a combined multiplicative
and additive approximation of the worst-case cut, independent of the maxima of f and
g over Rec.
A random circular cut can be modeled more generally when its location is distributed
with some distribution function with density ψ over Rec. Similarly to the uniform case,
an approximation of the expected damage caused by such a random cut to our stochastic
network model is given by ∫∫
Rec
ψ(p)EDCC(N, cut(p, r), ǫ′) dp. (10)
For a random circular cut distributed with density function ψ(p) over Rec, such that ψ is
a function of bounded variation over Rec, A multiplicative approximation algorithm can
be obtained by applying similar techniques as in Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 2, choosing
the grid constant ∆ small enough, such that multiplicative error factor will be at most ǫ.
The approximation and running time in this case depends also on the supremum on the
variation rate of ψ over Rec (which was zero in the uniform case), due its contribution
to the (multiplicative) accumulated error when evaluating numerically the integral (10)
over the grid.
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Figure 14: Color map of the the USA population density in logarithmic scale. Data is
taken from [20].
4.3 Simulations and Numerical Results
In order to test our algorithms, we estimate the expected impact of circular cuts on com-
munication networks in the USA based on a population density map. We implemented
the algorithm as a C program. Data for the population density of the USA taken from
[20] was taken as the intensity function f(u). The supplied data is the geographic density
of the USA population at a resolution of 30”, which is approximately equivalent to 0.9km.
The matrix given was of dimensions 3120× 7080. See Fig. 14.
In order to achieve faster running times, the data was averaged over 30 × 30 blocks,
to give a resolution of approximately 27km. This gave a matrix of dimensions 104× 236.
The algorithm was then run over this intensity function. The function y(u, v) was taken
to be 1/dist(u, v) , where dist is the Euclidean distance between the points, based on
observations that the lengths of physical Internet connections follow this distribution
[5]. The capacity probability function h was taken to be constant, independent of the
distance, reflecting an assumption of standard equipment. Each run took around 24 hours
on a standard Intel CPU computer.
Results for different cut radii are given in Fig. 15, Fig. 16 and Fig. 17. As can be
seen , the most harmful cut would be around NYC, as expected, where for the larger cut
radius, a cut between the east and west coast, effectively disconnecting California from
the north-east, would also be a worst case scenario. Lower, but still apparent maxima
are observed in the Los-Angeles, Seattle and Chicago areas.
Comparing the results to the results obtained for the fiber backbone in [32] (see Fig. 2)
it can be seen that some similarities and some dissimilarities exist. While the NYC
maxima is apparent in all measures, California seems to be missing from the maxima in
[32], probably reflecting the low density of fibers in that area in the map studied in [32].
26
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Figure 15: Color map of the centers of circular cuts with radius r = 5 (approximately
130km). Red is most harmful.
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Figure 16: Color map of the centers of circular cuts with radius r = 8 (approximately
208km). Red is most harmful.
As many fibers may exist that are not represented on the map in [32], it may be
reasonable to assume that a cut around California would have a more significant effect
than reflected there. On the other hand, several worst case cuts in Texas, and especially
in Florida are apparent in [32] and are missing in the current simulation results. It seems
that the effect of the narrow land bridge in Florida makes cuts there especially harmful,
whereas our simulation assumes links are straight lines, which will make links to both
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Figure 17: Color map of the centers of circular cuts with radius r = 10 (approximately
260km). Red is most harmful.
east and west coast pass through the ocean, thus making cuts less harmful.
As a full map of communication lines is not available, it is still unclear how good of an
approximation the results here supply. However, the tool can be used in conjunction with
more complicated modeling assumptions, including topographic features and economic
considerations to give more exact results.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
Conclusions Motivated by applications in the area of network robustness and surviv-
ability, we focused on the problem of geographically correlated network failures. Namely,
on assessing the impact of such failures to the network. While previous works in this
emerging field focused mainly on deterministic networks (as described in section 1.2), we
studied the problem under non-deterministic network models.
We proposed a method to stochastically model the geographical (physical) layout of
communication networks, i.e. the geographical locations of nodes and links, as well as
the capacity of the links. This applies to both the case where the network is derived from
a random model, or to the case where the physical topology of the network is unknown
(or partially known) to the attacker, who possesses some statistical information (e.g.,
population density, topography, economy) about the geographical area of the network, or
the probability of having link between various locations.
Using tools from geometric probability and numerical analysis, we developed approxi-
mation algorithms for finding the damage caused by physical disasters (modeled by circu-
lar cuts) at different points and to approximate the location and damage of the worst-case
cuts for this model. We also provided an algorithm to assess the impact of a random cir-
cular disaster (i.e. non-targeted) to our random network model, motivated by modeling
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a failure resulting from a natural disaster such as a hurricane or collateral (non-targeted)
damage in an EMP attack. We proved the correctness of our schemes and mentioned
the trade between running time and accuracy, for both additive and multiplicative error
terms.
In order to test the applicability of our model and algorithms to real-world scenarios,
we applied our algorithms to approximate the damage caused by cuts in different locations
to communications networks in the USA, where the network’s geographical layout was
modeled probabilistically, relying on demographic information (i.e. population density)
only. We found a strong correlation between locations of cuts that cause high relative
damage to the population density distribution over the network’s region. Some of the
results agree with the exact results obtained before about the fiber backbone of a major
network provider in the USA and some do not (as described in section 4.3). It is yet
to be determined if taking into account more links would lead to results closer to our
scheme’s prediction or whether the results are fundamentally different due to an inexact
link model.
Our results imply that some information on the network sensitivity and vulnerabilities
can be deduced from the population alone, with no information on any physical links and
nodes. Thus, our schemes allows to examine how valuable is public information (such
as demographic, topographic and economic information) to an attacker’s destruction
assessment capabilities, and examine the affect of hiding the actual physical location
of the fibers on the attack strategy. Thereby, the schemes can be used as a tool for
policy makers and engineers to design more robust networks by placing links along paths
that avoid areas of high damage cuts, or identifying locations which require additional
protection efforts (e.g., equipment shielding).
Future Work The discussion about finding vulnerable geographic locations to physical
attacks naturally leads to the question of robust network design in the face of geographical
failures. Several questions are proposed, one is to investigate the effect of adding minimal
infrastructure (e.g., lighting-up dark fibers) on network resilience, and determine how to
use low-cost shielding for existing components to mitigate large-scale physical attacks.
Another question is on designing the network’s physical topology under some demand
constraints (e.g., nodes that should be located within a specific region, capacity and flow
demands) such that the damage by a large-scale physical attack is minimized.
Another related research direction is to develop a framework for attack and defense
strategies for opponents having no knowledge of each other’s strategy. Using a game-
theoretic approach, study a two player zero sum game where one player (the defender)
attempts to design a network as resilient to physical attacks as possible under some
demand constraints, while the other player (the attacker) picks a location for the cut,
without having complete knowledge about the actual network’s physical structure.
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